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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17252 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of 
Theft, Second Degree Felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-404 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, was charged in an 
Information with two counts of Theft, felonies of the second degree 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). 
On the 14th day of July, 1980, the appellant was convicted by a 
jury of both counts as charged in the Information. On the 1st day 
of August, 1980, the appellant was sentenced to incarceration in 
the Utah State Prison to two indeterminate terms of one to 
fifteen years, said terms to run concurrently. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, seeks reversal 
of the judgment entered against him and a new trial in the 
above-entitled matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant was convicted of two counts of Theft. 
Count I was fo= :~ef[ of a Vehicle, and Count II was for Theft 
of Property, such property being valued at over $1,000.00. 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Charles Oliver testified that 
at approximately 9:15 p.m. on April 11, 1980, he spotted a 
westbound car on 1300 South which matched the description of 
a car reported as stolen an hour earlier. After a two block 
"chase," the vehicle pulled over into a parking lot at 1148 South 
and 300 West, and the appellant was discovered to be the driver. 
(T. 42-47) Cliff Bowden, the owner of the car, testified that 
he saw the appellant drive the vehicle away from the home of 
Elver Langdon, located at 48 South and 600 West, around 8:00 p.m. 
(T. 6, 35) 
Not disputing most of the above facts, the appellant 
testified that he had been drinking large amounts of alcohol 
with an acquaintance, one "Crazy Fish," during the day in questior 
(T. 71) Towards evening the two drove in the appellant's car 
to the house where he resided with his mother, located at 258 
North 800 West, "to get some more cash, money, and something to 
-2-
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eat." (T. 72, 79) While the appellant was in the house, 
Crazy Fish drove off in the appellant's car and the appellant 
pursued him on foot, heading south. (T. 72, 73) Upon 
discovering a car with keys in the ignition, the appellant 
drove off in that car in pursuit of Crazy Fish. (T. 73) 
The appellant testified that he then drove to Perkins, 
at 900 South State, where he had met Crazy Fish earlier in the 
day, talked to several people at Perkin's asking if anyone had 
seen Crazy Fish or the car, and then drove around the area 
between 900 South and 1300 South, and West Temple and 
300 West, where he believed Crazy Fish lived. (T. 74) The 
appellant stated that he did not at any time intend to steal 
the car, and was, in fact, driving back to where he had found 
it, in order to leave it "in the neighborhood" when he was 
pulled over and arrested. (T. 75) 
Kathy Murray, a foster sister to the appellant, 
corroborated his testimony in the following particulars. That 
the appellant and Crazy Fish were together on the day in question, 
and were intoxicated; that she saw Crazy Fish drive off in the 
appellant's car; that she saw the appellant pursue Crazy Fish 
on foot; and that the appellant's car was found on the evening 
of April 11th crashed into a telephone pole. (T. 60-63) 
The appellant did not raise the defense of voluntary 
intoxication, and therefore objected to Instruction 16-B on 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
voluntary intoxication. The appellant also excepted to the 
Court's failure to give a reasonable hypothesis instruction, 
which was properly requested in writing. (T. 98) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY 
INTOXICATION. 
Count I of the Information charged the appellant with 
Theft o~ a Vehicle. Jury Instruction No. 15 instructed the 
jury on the lesser included offense of Unlawful Taking of a 
Vehicle, which is a misdemeanor. The element of specific intent 
to deprive the owner of his property is required for Theft of 
a Vehicle, while an intent merely to temporarily deprive the 
owner of possession of his property would constitute Unlawful 
Taking of a Vehicle. This issue was of critical importance 
in the present case, where the appellant admitted that he 
unlawfully took Cliff Bowden's vehicle, but denied any intent 
to steal the car. 
The appellant's theory of the case, as outlined in 
the facts above, is that he just used Cliff Bowden's car for 
a short while, in order to search for his own car, and that he 
was in fact returning the car when arrested. The fact of appellar.: 
intoxication was only relevant to explain the circumstances 
under which he took Cliff Bowden's car, and was never claimed 
-4-
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by the appellant as a defense or an "excuse" for his actions. 
However, Jury Instruction No. 16-B, given by the court upon 
request of the State, and over defense counsel's objection, 
could Nery easily have confused and misled the jury into 
thinking that the appellant had raised the defense of voluntary 
intoxication and was offering his intoxication as the sole 
excuse for his conduct. That instruction provided: 
INSTRUCTION 16-B. 
Voluntary intoxication from alcohol 
or drugs is not a defense to the charge 
being considered unless the intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental 
state which is an element of the offense 
and which in the ca:se now before the 
court is that the defendant acted with 
a purpose to deprive an individual of 
his property. Being under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs is no excuse for the 
commission of a crime where it merely 
makes a person more excited or reckless, 
so that one does things one might not 
otherwise have done. To be a defense 
to such a crime, one must be so under 
the influence of alcohol that at the time 
of the alleged offense he did not know 
what he was then doing, so that he was 
then and there incapable of forming the 
necessary intent. 
It is a well settled principle of law that a defendant 
has a right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury 
in the form of instructions, at least where such theory is 
reasonably justified by the evidence, in a "clear and understandable way."1 
1. State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931); State v. 
Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Ut. 1980); State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 
(Ut. 1981); State v. Castillo, 23 Ut.2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969) 
-5-
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It is equally clear that ''[t]he purpose of an instruction is to 
enlighten a jury. " 2 An instruction which is confusing, rather 
than enlightening is properly refused. Specificall.J, an instruct> 
on the defense of voluntary intoxication is proper in those 
instances, and only in those instances, where "there has been 
evidence of alcohol intoxication which bears uoon the issue of 
a reguired specific intent." 3 (Emphasis supplied) 
The intoxication of the appellant in the ?resent case 
had absolutel7 no bearing upon the issue of specific intent, 
since the defense of voluntary intoxication was never asserted 
by the appellant--that is, the appellant never sought to negate 
the specific intent element by reason of this intoxication. 
And while the second sentence of Instruction No. 16-B in light 
of the facts presented at trial, may have been a proper warning 
I 
that intoxication is no excuse for the cormnission of a crime, 4 
the first and last sentences of that instruction were definitely 
improper. Each of these sentences informs the jury under 
which circumstances voluntary intoxication is a defense to a 
crime. Sandwiched in between is the sentence disallowing intoxicati:~ 
2. State v. Selgado, 76 N.M. 187, 413 P.2d 469, 471 (1966) 
3. Statev. James, 223 Kan. 107, 574P.2d181, 185 (1977); See a. 
State v. Potter, supra. 
4. The appellant is not hereby conceding that the second sent~~ 
of Instruction No. 16-B was proper, but is merely assuming so, 
in arguendo. For in fact, intoxication was not even offered as 
an excuse for the misdeed, but merely one of the circumstances 
describing the defendant's actions that day. 
-6-
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as an excuse for criminal activity, thus creating a strong 
overall impression that the appellant was trying to excuse and 
defend his conduct because of his intoxicated state, and that 
the jury must not accept the excuses or defenses offered by 
the appellant. 
In a slightly different context, in State v. Potter, 5 
this court held that confusing and misleading jury instructions 
on voluntary intoxication constituted prejudicial error. There, 
the defendant raised the defense of voluntary intoxication and 
proposed several jury instructions on that defense, all of which 
were denied. Instead, the trial court gave general instructions 
on the intent requirements of the crimes charged and the effect 
of intoxication upon the defendant's criminal culpability. 
In reversing the conviction, this court reasoned that "the 
instructions given in the present case were so general that 
they could have misled and confused the jury," and 
5. See footnote 1, supra. 
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[b]ecause the instructions given in 
the present case failed to explain 
adequately the distinction between the 
general and specific intent requirements 
or relate those requirements to the facts 
of the case and the different crimes 
charged, they were misleading and 
confusing.6 
Elaborating further, the court explained that because the 
instructions on intent and voluntary intoxication were so 
general and not related to the facts of the case, they: 
could have left the jury in a state of 
confusion or even with the impression 
~hat as a matter of law the defendant's 
voluntary intoxication could have no 7 
effect on the criminality of his conduct. 
In that case the court concluded that, for the reasons given abo•ie 
The instructions failed to present to 
the jury in a clear and understandable 
manner the substance of the defense 
advocated by the defendant. The 
instructions thus constitute error which 
was prejudicial to the defendant and 
deprived him of a fair trial.8 
In the present case, the instruction on voluntary 
intoxication presented a theory of the case advanced by neither 
the appellant nor the state (the defense of voluntary intoxication' 
and then negated that theory. This may well have confused and 
misled the jury into thinking that the defense of voluntary 
6. Id. at 78 
7. Id. at 80 
8. Id., citing State v. Day, 90 N.M. 154, 560 P.2d 945 (1977), 
People-v. Cesare, 68 A.D.2d 938, 414 N.Y.S. 2d 585 (1979), 
People v. Maliskey, 77 Mich.App. 444, 258 N.W. 2d 514 (1977). 
-8-
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-intoxication was the primary issue for it to decide. This is 
particularly true since Instruction No. 16-B was couched in terms 
nf 'Toluntary intoxication being no "defense." 
The instruction on voluntary intoxication was improper. 
lt was prejudicial because it may have confused and misled the 
jury, and :ailed to allow the appellant to present his theory 
of the case to the jury. Consequently, the trial court's 
giving of that instruction constituted reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE REASONABLE 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS REQUIREMENT. 
Although the State's case on Count I of the Information, 
Theft of a Vehicle, was based on some direct evidence (the 
appellant testified himself that he took the car without permission), 
the State's case on Count II, involving theft of property claimed 
by Cliff Bowden to have been inside the car before it was taken, 
was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. None of the 
alleged stolen property was ever discovered, and there was no 
evidence that the appellant had handled, moved or sold any such 
property. The entire case against the appellant on Count II was 
Cliff Bowden's testimony that such property existed, was in the 
car before the appellant drove off, and was missing when the car 
was recovered. Even the valuation of the property was 
determined solely by Cliff Bowden's testimony. And by Mr. Bowden's 
cestimony, the car sat, unlocked and unattended, for some 10 or 
-9-
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15 minutes in front of the Langdon home before the appellant 
took it. The appellant's testimony was that the car sat for a 
similar period in front of Perkin's while he was inside 
questioning people as to the whereabouts of his own car. The 
evidence presented relevant to Count II, therefore, was entireli" 
circumstantial. 
The appellant excepted to the trial court's failure 
to give the last paragraph of appellant's proposed Instruction 
No. 2, on th.e reasonable alternative hypothesis. This ?aragrapt 
stated: 
To warrant you in convicting the 
defendant, the evidence must to your 
minds exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than that of the guilt 
of the defendant. That is to say, if 
after an entire consideration and 
comparison of all the testimony in the 
case you can reasonably explain the facts 
given in evidence on any reasonable ground 
other than the guilt of the defendant, 
you should acquit him. 
This instruction is entirely consistent with the law 
as stated originally in State v. Crawford,9 that: 
[T]he rule applied in cases dependent 
solely upon circumstantial evidence, as 
in the case at bar, [is] that the 
circumstances must be such as to 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
except that of the defendant's guilt 
of the offense charged. 
9. 59 Utah 39, 201 P.1030, 1033 (1921). See also State v. Erwir 
120 P.2d 285, 302 (1941); State v. Marasco 81 Utah 325, 17 P.'fcl 
919 (1933). . 
-10-
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It further appears that this rule of law, in circumstantial 
evidence cases, must be explained to the jury: 
It has long been the law in this 
jurisdiction that the giving of 
such an instruction [the reasonable 
alternative hypothesis] is neither 
appropriate nor required unless the 
proof of a material issue is based 
solely upon circumstantial evidence.lo 
In discussing the same issue, this court in State v. Schad, 
~70 P.2d 246, 247 (Ut. 1970), used the following reasoning: 
It is true, as the defendant contends, 
that where a conviction is based on 
circumstantial evidence, the evidence 
should be looked upon with caution, 
and that it must exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant. 
This is entirely logical, because if the 
jury believes that there is a reasonable 
hypothesis in the evidence consistent 
with the defendant's innocence, there would 
naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his 
guilt. Nevertheless, that proposition 
does not apply to each circumstance 
separately, but is a matter within the 
prerogative of the jury to determine 
from all of the facts and circumstances 
shown; and if therefrom they are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
guilt, it necessarily follows that they 
regarded the evidence as excluding every 
other reasonable hypothesis. 
However, this is only true if the jury specifically understands 
that a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence constitutes 
a reasonable doubt. 
10. State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ut. 1978); 
State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Ut. 1977); State v. Garcia, 
IT Ut.2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960). 
-11-
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In State v. Eagle, 11 this court, while seemingly 
ignoring the case law cited in footnotes 9 and 10, supra, highl:' 
criticized the request of the defendant in that case for an 
instruction on the reasonable alternative hypothesis, describing 
any controversy over such an instruction as "nothin1:; more than a 
tempest in a teapot."1 2 In so doing, the court stated: 
The use of the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis instruction is merely one 
way of expressing that necessary burden 
of proof and there is no apparent 
reason to mandate that one, and only one, 
particular instruction being used by 
trial judges in conveying to the jury 
the meaning of that elusive phrase, 
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 13 
And in State v. King, 14 after quoting the same paragraph 
from Schad as appears above, the court stated: 
Of course, the requested instructions 
may make more understandable and 
explicit the usual instruction on 
burden of proof. 
Thus, with all due respect, it appears that the princ~h 
reason that trial courts deny the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis instruction is because it too clearly informs the 
jury of what the real burden of proof in a criminal case is. 
It is undisputed that the reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction is a correct statement of the law; and it is 
11. 611 P.2d 1211 (Ut. 1980) 
12. Id. at 1213. 
13. Id. 
14. 604 P.2d 923, 926 (Ut. 1979). 
- 1 ?-
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admitted by this court that such an instruction helps clarify 
the ourden of proof to the jury. In fact, the only reason 
this court has ever given for supporting a trial court's denial 
of the instruction is the "tempest in a teapot" argument used 
in Eagle--that the clarity the proposed instruction gives to 
other burden of proof instructions would not make a significant 
difference in the jury's deliberations. 
If this instruction really does have an insignificant 
impact on juries, why do prosecutors so vehemently oppose it, 
and why, pray tell, are the trial judges constantly denying it, 
when it correctly states the law and makes more clear to the 
jury what its duty is? And ultimately, why should this court 
deny to a defendant his chance to inform the jury more clearly 
as to the meaning of the "elusive phrase," "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt"? 
In determining whether a failure to give a requested 
instruction is prejudicial, the question is whether "if the 
requested instruction had been given and the jury had so 
considered the evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that it may have had some effect on the verdict rendered."15 
15. State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Ut. 1977) 
-13-
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In the present case, where the appellant was only in possession 
of the car which contained the missing property for one hour, 
and where that car sat unlocked and unattended for 10-15 
minutes on two separate occasions, and where no evidence 
whatsoever was found connecting the appellant with the missing 
property other than his possession of the vehicle, the jury 
might well have thought it reasonably possible that someone 
else stole the prooerty from the car. And, not having been 
instructed t~at :tis would constitute a reasonable doubt under 
the law, the jury may have convicted the appellant in spite of 
entertaining this possibility. Therefore, under the Mitcheson 
test, a reasonable likelihood exists that the failure to give 
the requested instruction had an effect on the verdict rendered, 
and such would constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the appellant did not raise the defense of 
voluntary intoxication, Instruction No. 16-B may have confused 
and misled the jury in its deliberations. This is particularly 
true since the defense of lack of specific intent had been 
raised on other grounds. This error was prejudicial and requires 
a reversal of the judgment. 
The refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury 
on the reasonable alternative hypothesis very likely resulted in 
-14-
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confusing the jury as to the burden of proof. And since the 
evidence on Count II was entirely circumstantial and the case 
against the appellant was weak, the denial of the requested 
instruction may very well have affected the jury's decision. 
For these reasons, the appellant's conviction on both counts 
should be reversed, and the case remanded to the Third Judicial 
District Court for a new trial. 
Appellant 
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